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Insolvency proceeding and liquidation of bankrupt companies are important topics in days of 
economic slowdown which aﬀ ected all economies a er ﬁ nancial crisis. This paper aims to ﬁ nd main 
diﬀ erences between insolvency proceedings in the countries of Visegrad four. The main goal is to 
describe insolvency law in member countries and then to compare it from the poin of view of main 
actors. This comparison can help to ﬁ nd which changes and ideas could be applied to improve and 
make more eﬀ ective the Czech insolvency system. The countries of Visegrad four was selected because 
of their common history and similar economic development. First of all, the legal background of 
insolvency proceedings which is possible for legal entities in these countries is examined. Then this 
paper deals with insolvency proceedings from the point of view of their participants – creditors, 
debtors and insolvency administrator. We have found that insolvency proceedings in these countries 
are very similar but there is still some inspiration for the Czech insolvency system.
Keywords: Visegrad four, insolvency proceedings, creditor, debtor, insolvency administrator, 
reorganization, bankruptcy
INTRODUCTION
Cooperation between four countries of 
the former communist bloc, known as the Visegrad 
Four, was oﬃ  cially established in 1991. The Czech 
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland undertook 
a joint eﬀ ort leading to better integration with 
the more developed western countries of Europe in 
preparation for joining the European Union. This 
goal was achieved in 2004, when the V4 countries 
joined the EU. In addition to continued cooperation, 
further cooperation with other countries has 
developed, especially with neighbours of the V4 in 
ﬁ elds of culture, education, science and information 
exchange, all of which has led to increased stability in 
Central Europe. These countries were also aﬀ ected 
by the global ﬁ nancial crisis of 2007, which resulted 
in the deterioration of economic development 
especially in 2008. Even now, all attempts have failed 
to overcome the consequences of the crisis and 
the GDP is still below the level before the crisis. One 
of the consequences of the economic slowdown, 
which has worsened the business environment, 
is increasingly frequent business bankruptcies. 
The eﬀ ort to establish eﬃ  cient insolvency 
proceedings is now being undertaken in each 
V4 country. If the enterprise is still salvageable, 
the best option appears to be reorganization, which 
preserves jobs. With increased unemployment 
the economy continues to decelerate. However, if 
the rescue of the enterprise is no longer possible, 
bankruptcy proceedings are opened. 
The necessity of well-funcioning insolvency 
system is stressed with increasing numbers of 
insolvency proceedings in all Visegrad four 
countries (Tab. I). 
This paper provides a comparative analysis 
of how insolvency proceedings in the Visegrad 
countries are set so as to compare the conditions 
for declaring a state of insolvency, possibilities for 
opening reorganization proceedings, obstacles 
during each procedure, duties and competences 
of the individual participants. The development of 
insolvency law from 1990 to the present has been 
outlined in all V4 countries; further, the role of 
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the court, the role and obligations of insolvency 
administrators and the position of debtors and 
creditors in individual V4 country legal systems 
has been analysed. The aim of the contribution is 
to ﬁ nd where the insolvency proceedings diﬀ er in 
countries, which faced a centrally planned economy 
for a long time and which have operated under 
market economy conditions for only a relatively 
short time compared with Western Europe. By 
comparison of the approach of individual systems 
in V4 countries, insights on insolvency process 
settlement methods which could be eﬀ ective in 
the Czech environment will then be evaluated. 
Eﬀ ectively set insolvency proceedings are one 
of the ways of improving the competitiveness of 
the country. Because insolvency proceedings in 
the V4 countries were considered highly ineﬃ  cient 
in the past, the law dealing with this issue was 
recently amended in all four countries. However, 
inspiration for the Czech Republic can still be 
found.
Literature Review
In a healthily functioning business environment 
it is necessary to develop a legal basis not only for 
the operation of successful companies but also 
for the settlement of unsuccessful companies that 
have to be terminated. A failed company become 
a bankrupt or insolvent when it is no longer able 
to pay its liabilities or make other arrangements 
with creditors. Greater attention has recently been 
paid to this issue and many states have revised and 
amended their laws accordingly.
If insolvency law did not exist, each of the debtor’s 
creditors would be placed in a situation in which they 
would wish to enforce their receivables individually 
as soon as possible. The prisoner’s dilemma arises if 
creditors’ receivables are not secured in some way. 
Creditors wish to commence enforcing receivables 
as soon as possible, even without any information 
as to the existence of other creditors. A collective 
method of enforcing receivables – i.e. insolvency 
proceedings – thus has to be ﬁ xed (Schillig, 2014).
Insolvency proceedings serve two goals. First and 
foremost, creditor satisfaction is at issue. The second 
goal is macroeconomic, i.e. the endeavour to return 
productive assets to the productive process. These 
goals are fulﬁ lled only with diﬃ  culty if insolvency 
proceedings are too lengthy (Paulus et al., 2015).
Insolvency proceedings should in principle 
determine the course of exit from the market in 
such a way that the action of all participants is 
the most eﬀ ective. In the event that the company is 
unable to meet its obligations for whatever reason, 
termination will follow and the debtor may not 
always act eﬀ ectively. The best option is to transfer 
decision-making authority to the creditors, whose 
claims are to be met from the distribution of 
the remaining assets, as they are the most motivated 
to allocate assets eﬃ  ciently (Richter, 2008, pp. 131–
132).
Westbrook et al. (2010, p. 2) are also inclined to 
the notion of eﬀ ective insolvency proceedings, but 
they argue that the concept of eﬃ  ciency is elusive 
and has to be viewed not only from the creditors’ but 
also from the debtor’s perspective. Eﬃ  ciency is just 
one of the requirements that should be attributed to 
the insolvency proceedings.
 Transparency is also important, including 
registers of trustees and registers of the progress of 
individual insolvency proceedings. Transparency 
goes hand in hand with predictability. A low ability 
to predict the outcome of the procedure o en leads 
to increased costs of insolvency. A simpler and 
clearer system entails higher predictability.
In contrast to the eﬀ orts of most countries to make 
insolvency proceedings more eﬃ  cient, Djankov 
et al. (2009, p. 1146) document that insolvency 
proceedings are in fact rather ineﬃ  cient in the vast 
majority of cases. This ineﬃ  ciency is due to high 
administrative costs, delays in the proceedings, and 
excessive use of liquidation (despite the possibility 
to reorganize a business in some instances). Djankov 
relates the state and eﬀ ectiveness of the insolvency 
proceedings with the legal system of the country 
and also with the level of public administration. 
The quality of legal standards also signiﬁ cantly 
aﬀ ects credit risk management in commercial 
banks. This issue is examined, for example, by Belás, 
Cipovová, Novák and Polách (2012) or Cipovová, 
Belás (2013).
According to Franken (2014), insolvency 
proceedings are eﬃ  cient when they maximise the 
value of the company in bankruptcy. The selection 
of a suitable bankruptcy settlement method has 
to be made in connection with the time when 
the business will reach the highest value. If an 
alternative utilisation thereof is more favourable, 
its sale should take place. On the other hand, if the 
value of the business is maximised in its present 
usage, reorganisation should take place (Franken, 
2014).
I: Number of insolvencies in V4 countries in 2010–2013
Country 2013 2012 2011 2010
Czech Republic 10,325 7,723 5,880 5,559
Hungary* 47,347 50,224 30,757 17,487
Poland 915 908 762 665
Slovakia 880 866 870 830
Source: Creditform
* numbers for corporate insolvency proceedings and voluntary liquidation
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All of these attributes are focused on 
the relationship between debtor and creditor, but 
insolvency proceedings aﬀ ect stakeholders also at 
a personal level. Owners of bankrupt companies are 
aﬀ ected by the loss of the company that they have 
built, while employees lose their jobs (Fergusson 
2009, p. 205).
METHODOLOGY 
This article compares four insolvency systems 
in states that promote economic cooperation 
so as to ﬁ nd inspiration for Czech insolvency 
proceedings and to propose changes that could lead 
to an improvement of insolvency proceedings in 
the Czech Republic. 
The method of literature review was used. 
This is focused on the regulation of insolvency 
proceedings in selected countries ﬁ rstly. It 
also contains a comparison of the deﬁ nition of 
insolvency and possible solutions to discrepancies 
in these deﬁ nitions. The other sections are divided 
according to the three main ﬁ gures in the insolvency 
proceedings. The insolvency administrator is 
the person who establishes the ﬁ nal form of 
insolvency proceedings and supervises the whole 
procedure. The debtor has limited authority but 
the creditors are the elemental decision makers. At 
the conclusion, insolvency proceedings in countries 
of V4 are compared. Key diﬀ erences between 
insolvency proceedings in these countries are 
summarized. Suggestions for the Czech Republic 
are proposed on the basis thereof.
Legislation and the Possible Settlement 
of Insolvency
The Czech Republic
The foundation stone of insolvency law in 
the Czech Republic is Act No. 182/2006 Coll. on 
Bankruptcy and its Settlement (the Insolvency 
Act). The current legislation was adopted a er 
a long critique of the previous one, which was 
considered the catalyst of many corruption cases 
for its interpretive ambiguity. The new bankruptcy 
law came into force in 2008 a er great expectations, 
although not all of these were met. If the purpose was 
to increase clarity and transparency in insolvency 
proceedings, the major changes certainly achieved 
almost nothing. The observed parameters, such 
as the duration of proceedings, cost, satisfaction 
of creditors, etc., remained almost unchanged. 
The claim that the law failed in the business 
environment is substantiated by the fact that it has 
already been amended (Kislingerová et al., 2013, pp. 
6–9).
The above law can be applied if the debtor is in 
bankruptcy. Under the provisions of the Insolvency 
Act, bankruptcy applies to insolvency and over-
indebtedness. While insolvency is a reason for 
initiating proceedings for legal and natural persons 
(non-entrepreneurs), over-indebtedness applies 
only to business entities. The Insolvency Act 
speciﬁ es three conditions that deﬁ ne insolvency. 
The debtor must have multiple creditors, ﬁ nancial 
obligations must be 30 days overdue, and the debtor 
is unable to meet commitments (Hásová and 
Moravec, 2013, p. 6).
Czech insolvency law gives legal persons two 
options for resolving insolvency. The ﬁ rst is 
bankruptcy, the traditional liquidation of assets 
of the bankrupt company with the subsequent 
satisfaction of creditors from the proceeds. 
The second solution, rarely applied in Czech 
practice, is satisfaction of creditor claims with 
the restructured activities of the debtor (Hásová and 
Moravec, 2013, p. 93).
Slovakia
Contemporary Slovak bankruptcy law is 
governed by Act No. 348/2011 Zz on Bankruptcy 
and Restructuring. The new legislation seeks 
to respond to current economic developments 
both in its own country, as well as on a European 
scale. An unfortunate tendency can be observed 
in the number of insolvencies handled by legal 
entities. Eﬀ orts have also been made to move closer 
to Western legal modiﬁ cation, in which the attempt 
is made to preserve the company prior to its factual 
liquidation. This phenomenon is particularly 
evident in the growing number of permitted 
reorganizations (Richter, 2005).
According to the above-mentioned law, the debtor 
is bankrupt if it is in default or over-indebted. 
A debtor is considered to be in default when it 
cannot meet at least two monetary commitments 
30 days past maturity to more than one creditor. 
A debtor who has more than one creditor and 
the value of its mature liabilities exceeds the value 
of its property is considered to be over-indebted 
(Richter, 2005).
Slovak bankruptcy law gives legal persons two 
possibilities to settle a bankruptcy. These are 
bankruptcy and reorganization (“restructuring” in 
Slovak terms). The result of the former is the sale 
the debtor’s remaining property and the subsequent 
satisfaction of the creditors with the yields. By 
contrast, the aim of reorganization is the satisfaction 
of creditors from the debtor’s further (restructured) 
activities (Jakubec and Kardoš, 2012).
Poland
Polish insolvency law is governed by 
the Bankruptcy and Recovery Law, in force since 
2003. This Act was recently amended in 2009. 
The current modiﬁ cation requires using tests to 
determine whether the debtor is insolvent. The ﬁ rst 
test is a test of liquidity. On the basis thereof, 
the debtor is insolvent if it is unable to pay its debts 
as they become due. The second test is a test of 
the balance sheet, according to which the debtor 
is insolvent if its total liabilities exceed the value of 
total assets (even in the case when the obligations 
are paid in time). In the case of sole traders only 
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the test of liquidity is performed (Cliﬀ ord Chance, 
2010, pp. 59–60).
When the debtor is insolvent on the basis of 
previous tests, its state will be resolved in one 
of two ways. The ﬁ rst is a simple solution using 
single insolvency proceedings. This is classically 
conducted under the supervision of the court, 
which may order settlement through liquidation 
or rescue of the debtor’s business. Moreover, 
a separate recovery proceeding is permitted by 
law. This method is relatively simple and is guided 
not by a court but by the debtor. The aim is to give 
the debtor a framework within which it is able to 
achieve a composition arrangement with creditors. 
Recovery proceedings are optional. Creditors 
cannot propose this method (Skibiňska, 2011, 
p. 228).
Insolvency proceedings may be initiated either 
voluntarily, if a petition is ﬁ led by the debtor itself, 
or involuntarily in the case where the application is 
made by any of the creditors. Consequently, the role 
of the court is to decide whether the bankruptcy 
or restructuring will be used to solve debtor’s 
bankruptcy (www.lexology.com).
Hungary
Legislation of insolvency proceedings in 
Hungary is adjusted in Act XLIL on Bankruptcy 
and Liquidation Proceedings of 1991. This Act has 
frequently been discussed in the past and eﬀ orts to 
reform this Act began in 2003. The aim of the reform 
is to set such a course of insolvency proceedings 
which should mainly promote a greater degree of 
satisfaction of creditors and shorter duration of 
insolvency proceedings (Széplak, 2006, pp. 41–42). 
The long-prepared reform entered into force in 
2009.
In Hungary, a test of cash-ﬂ ow is used to determine 
the debtor’s state of insolvency. In practice, a debtor 
is considered insolvent if its obligations are more 
than 20 days overdue and it is incapable to pay 
them; it is unable to settle obligations arising from 
the court ruling; on the basis of recovery, it is found 
that the recovery is unsuccessful, bankruptcy 
proceedings were ordered by the court, the sum of 
the debt exceeds the sum of assets, or the 45-day 
deadline allowed by the court a er request of debtor 
expired (Nagy-Koppány, Csurdi and Németh, 2013).
Under this Act, a state of insolvency can be 
solved with liquidation or reorganization, which is 
known as bankruptcy proceedings in Hungary. If 
a debtor ﬁ nds itself in a state of insolvency, it may 
ﬁ le a petition for commencement of liquidation. 
However, this proposal may also be made by any 
creditor if it considers the debtor’s insolvency to 
have occurred. In the proposal, both the debtor and 
the creditors may choose what type of insolvency 
solution will be preferred. In the event of insolvency 
proceedings with a subsequent solution in the form 
of reorganization, the debtor seeks help in solving 
its ﬁ nancial problems and achieves a composition 
agreement with creditors. The aim of this procedure 
is the reorganization of the debtor’s business in 
such a way that allows preservation of its business 
activities. Generally, the reorganization procedure 
is very rarely used in Hungary. Therefore, the aim of 
the new bankruptcy law is to extend this possibility. 
One of the reasons is the fact that the liquidation 
procedure is generally very expensive, time 
consuming, and unfortunately still entails a very 
uncertain outcome for creditor that is close to zero 
(Cliﬀ ord Chance, 2010, p. 84).
The Role of the Insolvency Administrator
The Czech Republic
The insolvency administrator is a person 
appointed by the court from the list of trustees led 
by the Ministry of Justice.
Before the ﬁ rst meeting of creditors, the insol-
vency administrator establishes a list of registered 
claims. He examines each claim and decides whether 
to accept or deny them in amount or authenticity.
When the bankruptcy is settled with reorga-
nization, Insolvency administrator has a supervisory 
role. The insolvency administrator monitors 
compliance with the conditions approved by the 
court and transfers the raised funds to creditors.
Supervisory activity over the insolvency admin-
istrator is performed by the appropriate bankruptcy 
court. The court has signiﬁ cant decision-making 
power throughout the insolvency proceeding; it 
takes necessary steps to ensure the purpose of this 
procedure, imposes obligations on the subject of 
the proceedings, requires reports and explanations 
from the administrator and in fact gives 
administrators consent in the case of “non-standard” 
procedures (Hásová and Moravec, 2013, pp. 24– 36). 
The insolvency administrator likewise answers 
to creditor bodies which are authorised to give 
instructions to the administrator, e.g. to monetise 
property or regarding the level of expenses; they can 
also relieve the court-appointed administrator and 
replace him or her with an administrator appointed 
by the creditors. For the performance of the post of 
insolvency administrator, a minimum of three years 
of practice has to be completed at an insolvency 
administrator’s oﬃ  ce; further, university education 
is required and insolvency administrator’s 
examinations have to be passed.
Slovakia
The cornerstone of Slovak insolvency 
proceedings is the ﬁ gure of the administrator, 
whereas it is not possible to omit his strictly 
regulated selection. His role is crucial especially in 
the case of reorganization in view of the fact that 
a debtor can ﬁ le an insolvency proposal only in 
a case where an appraisal has been compiled by an 
appointed administrator. It is precisely here that 
strict requirements as to the person (qualiﬁ cation) 
of the administrator appear, as he must (besides 
his legal knowledge) prove knowledge of economic 
indicators and practical commercial skills in the 
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appraisal. The result of his eﬀ orts is therefore 
a recommendation or non-recommendation for 
reorganization. The court then acts according 
the administrator’s standpoint and permits or 
denies reorganization. The administrator thus has 
a special role which represents a necessary ﬁ rst stage 
of judicial proceedings to permit reorganization 
(Veterníková and Mišura, 2011, pp. 153–156).
Poland
The bankruptcy trustee appears on the scene when 
a debtor is declared bankrupt and the bankruptcy is 
to be settled by liquidation. His main responsibility 
is to manage the process and the realization 
of the debtor’s assets. A er this realization, he 
establishes a schedule and then proceeds to satisfy 
the creditor under the regulations stipulated in 
the Insolvency Act. When the state of insolvency is 
settled by a composition agreement with creditors, 
the curator is chosen by the insolvency court from 
the list of curators holding a bankruptcy trustee 
license (www.europa.eu, 2012).
In Poland, there are very strictly deﬁ ned 
regulations governing faulty or fraudulent 
management of the company resulting in the 
bankruptcy thereof. The insolvency administrator 
is thus authorized to take steps to punish the debtor 
during the performance of his duties if he detects 
such behaviour (Cliﬀ ord Chance, 2010, p. 61).
Hungary
In a case where insolvency is settled by 
reorganization, the insolvency court appoints 
an independent administrator. His main task 
is to oversee the activities of the debtor and 
defend the interests of the creditors. When he 
checks the debtor’s business, he also checks 
the obligations that have arisen in the past and 
approves the commitments that need to be taken 
to preserve the business enterprise. He has in his 
power the ability to challenge certain contracts that 
were accepted without prior approval and initiate 
proceedings for the recovery of any amount that 
was paid in contravention of the Insolvency Act. 
Together with the debtor, he requests creditors to 
register and subsequently classify all registered 
claims. In the event of reorganization, he should 
also attend all the meetings and help to negotiate 
and prepare a composition agreement. His 
responsibility is to subsequently approve this plan. 
If the court has ordered liquidation of the company, 
a liquidator appointed by the court from the list of 
oﬃ  cial liquidators enters the scene (Cliﬀ ord Chance, 
2010, pp. 85–87).
The Status of the Debtor
The Czech Republic
The debtor has a clear obligation to ﬁ le 
a bankruptcy petition at the court if it ﬁ nds itself 
insolvent. If it fails to do so, it may subsequently be 
punished or even prosecuted.
Subsequently, its position is inﬂ uenced by 
the way in which the state of insolvency will be 
settled. If the court decides to settle the insolvency 
by liquidation, the debtor’s position becomes 
very limited, as the management of the company 
is assumed by the administrator. In the case of 
reorganization the debtor is entitled to retain 
decision-making power, but its steps are overseen 
by the insolvency administrator and creditors’ 
committee. While the activity of the company is 
preserved, the debtor prepares a reorganization 
plan which it subsequently communicates with 
the creditors’ committee and the insolvency 
administrator (Hásová and Moravec, 2013, p. 16).
Slovakia
The position of the debtor is also conditioned by 
the manner in which the bankruptcy is to be settled. 
Bankruptcy proceedings impose on the debtor 
the obligation to ﬁ le an insolvency proposal. Non-
fulﬁ lment of this obligation is understood to be 
a contravention of protection of the creditors 
and is punishable by law. In a case where a legal 
person – debtor is unable to repay its debts and 
the company management is aware of this state, 
it is obliged to ﬁ le a proposal for declaration of 
bankruptcy or a proposal to permit reorganization. 
If a member of the board of directors does not 
commence bankruptcy proceedings within 30 days 
from the moment when they become aware – in 
their position in the company – of its bankruptcy, 
the company continues to be responsible to the 
creditors for damages incurred to them as a result 
of such conduct. At the same time, the debtor in 
bankruptcy proceedings is obliged to coaction 
with the administrator when gathering property 
and meeting liabilities. Where reorganization is 
concerned, the debtor is granted the more initiative 
position, which is, however, strongly subordinate 
to the administrator’s jurisdiction. The debtor 
primarily retains limited authority to handle 
property and continue to manage the business 
(Jakubec and Kardoš, 2012).
Poland
The debtor is required to ﬁ le an insolvency 
petition within two weeks from the time when 
the conditions for declaring bankruptcy have 
occurred. Bankruptcy law presumes very good 
knowledge of the balance sheet and all obligations 
by the debtor. Therefore, in the case of a balance 
sheet test, not only overdue obligations, but 
also liabilities close to maturity should be taken 
into account (Cliﬀ ord Chance, 2010, pp. 59–
61). Directors of the debtor company is liable 
for damages that are incurred to creditors due to 
the fact that the bankruptcy petition was not duly 
ﬁ led. A debtor, who in anticipation of imminent 
bankruptcy pays more attention to certain creditors 
over others, may be punished (www.lexology.com).
240 Zuzana Crhová, Zuzana Fišerová, Marie Paseková
Hungary
The debtor company does not have a statutory 
responsibility to ﬁ le an insolvency petition in 
court, but the management of a limited company 
or a company limited by shares is to convene 
a meeting of members or a shareholders’ meeting as 
soon as possible a er ﬁ nding that it faces a state of 
insolvency or is unable to pay its obligations.
If the court commences bankruptcy proceedings, 
the debtor is automatically guaranteed a withdrawal 
period known as a moratorium. This could be 
anywhere from 90 to 365 days, but which may 
subsequently be extended for an additional 180 to 
365 days, but only with the consent of the lenders. 
During the moratorium, the debtor company 
is strictly limited to make payments. The only 
exception is employee wages, VAT and social 
security payments. The power to conduct other 
payments shi s into the hands of the bankruptcy 
trustee (Cliﬀ ord Chance, 2010, p. 85).
The Rights and Obligations of Creditors
The Czech Republic
Creditors have the right to request opening of 
insolvency proceedings in the event that their 
overdue debts are not paid by the debtor and 
creditors reasonably believe that the debtor has 
arrived in a state of insolvency. A creditor who ﬁ les 
a proposal might be requested by the insolvency 
court for an advance payment for the costs of 
the insolvency proceedings, the amount of which 
may be up to CZK 50,000. If the deposit is not paid, 
the proceedings could be suspended; the deposit 
for insolvency proceeding expenses can also 
be enforced by the court. Both in the cases of 
the creditor’s proposal and that of the debtor’s, 
commencement of insolvency proceedings depend 
on a court ruling and the placement or non-
placement of a deposit. 
A er the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings, the court declares the deadline for 
registration of debts. This deadline is ﬁ xed at 
2 months by the Insolvency Act, whilst the deadline 
is 30 days in personal bankruptcies. A er the end of 
this period, no further applications are considered. 
The creditors are therefore obliged to monitor the 
status of the debtor in insolvency register (Hásová 
and Moravec, 2013, p. 16).
Creditors have a high degree of decision-making 
power. They could select a bankruptcy settlement 
method, whilst the court decides in a case of non-
fulﬁ lment of legal conditions. They can participate 
in the creditor committee. As part of the creditors’ 
committee, they may express (based on votes) 
whether they agree with or disapprove of settlement 
by reorganization.
Slovakia
As of 2012, conditions for ﬁ ling a creditor’s 
insolvency proposal have been relaxed. Prior to 
this, a creditor could ﬁ le a proposal for declaring 
a debtor bankrupt only if the debtor was over 30 
days in delay with fulﬁ lling at least two monetary 
commitments towards more than one creditor and 
at least one of these creditors demanded payment of 
their receivables from the debtor. Newly, a creditor 
has to ﬁ le a proposal to declare bankruptcy, in 
which it states its receivable from the debtor and 
substantiates this with conﬁ rmation from an auditor 
or court-appointed expert that the receivable 
has a substantiated origin of emergence. In 
the proposal, the creditor will also state other 
creditors of the debtor who have receivables due 
from the debtor over 30 days due and, as the case 
may be, will note further facts bearing testimony 
to the debtor’s ﬁ nancial insolvency. The proposal 
has to be supplemented with a receipt for payment 
of a deposit for the expenses of a preliminary 
administrator, 1, 600 E for debtor-legal entities. 
A practical impact of the legal amendment is an 
increase in the number of creditors who enforce 
their receivables from debtor-legal entities by means 
of ﬁ ling a proposal for declaration of bankruptcy 
(Pálinkás and Ranič, 2012).
When the insolvency of a debtor is solved via 
restructuring plan creditors have to approve this 
plan. At the Approval Meeting of the Creditors, 
they vote about acceptation of the plan or raise 
objections against the plan. If they have a feeling that 
the restructuring plan will be ineﬀ ective in respect 
of their receivables they declare it to the court. 
(European Commission)
Poland
Creditors have the opportunity to send the court 
a petition to open insolvency proceedings and 
note the manner in which they prefer to settle 
the debtor’s insolvency. Alternatively, if creditors 
insist on solving the debtor’s insolvency through 
reorganization, even though the court does not 
recommend this option, the court will take into 
account their wishes. A er selecting reorganization, 
it is essential to prepare a composition agreement 
which is subsequently voted by creditors. A er 
the approval of the composition agreement, 
creditors who disagree with this option and feel 
they are at a disadvantage have the opportunity to 
ﬁ le an objection. On the other hand, the creditors 
have the opportunity to prepare a composition 
agreement themselves (Cliﬀ ord Chance, 2010, 
pp. 59–62).
Hungary
The creditor can send the court a petition to 
open insolvency proceeding when requests 
debtor’s liquidation. The creditor cannot 
suggest restructuration proceedings of a debtor. 
The creditor is obliged to report to the debtor and 
to the insolvency administrator any claims existing 
against the debtor, especially within the period 
speciﬁ ed by the court, which is usually within 
40 days of the commencement of bankruptcy 
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proceedings. Creditors are also given a second 
opportunity if they miss the deadline set by 
the court, and the claim can still be registered 
within the following 180 days. These late claims, 
however, will be satisﬁ ed a er the satisfaction of 
timely applications, which is the penalty for late 
registration (Euler Hermes, 2014).
DISCUSSION
As Cirmizi et al. (2008) state the essential 
presumption for well-functioning insolvency 
proceedings is to ensure that reorganization will be 
available for all companies capable to survive and 
bankruptcy for the rest of bankrupt companies at 
a low cost. The eﬀ ective insolvency proceedings 
should also take into account interests of all parties 
involved.
The insolvency systems of the Visegrad Four 
countries have recently been re-codiﬁ ed. At 
present, the insolvent state of business entities in 
these countries should be solved in two basic ways, 
reorganization or liquidation. The only diﬀ erence 
is in the naming of these ways in the diﬀ erent 
countries. In Poland, there is also the possibility 
of applying for out-of court reorganization, which 
means lower costs of proceedings. Balance sheet 
and liquidity tests are generally used to determine 
the state of insolvency. Only Hungary primarily 
uses liquidity tests, which, according to Westbrook 
et al. (2010, p. 65), are easier to use, especially for 
the creditors. They are of the opinion that a case 
of non-payment of the debts owed by the debtor 
constitutes suﬃ  cient grounds for the initiation of 
insolvency proceedings.
The position of the insolvency administrator will 
vary depending on the method chosen for settling 
the debtor’s bankruptcy. The weaker position 
of the insolvency administrator is apparent in 
the course of the reorganization proceedings 
where the administrator merely supervises 
the debtor’s steps. Where liquidation is concerned, 
the administrator is responsible for the entire 
process. In particular, the Slovaks are trying to shi  
decision-making power at least partly to the hands of 
the administrator, who may suggest the possibility of 
reorganization based on his examination. The ﬁ nal 
decision, however, is in the hands of the insolvency 
court.
The debtor’s essential obligation is to ﬁ le an 
insolvency petition. Generally speaking, the debtor 
is obliged to do so as soon as possible when it is 
aware or ought to have known that the company 
is in a state of insolvency. The only exception is 
in Hungary, where the Insolvency Act does not 
require this obligation. Regulations are strictly 
determined in Poland in the area of penalties for 
failure to comply with the insolvency petition. In 
our opinion, it is only correct that managers may be 
also punished by law for damages incurred by their 
conduct insofar as some managers lead the company 
fraudulently in order to ensure personal beneﬁ t.
Based on a test of liquidity, creditors have 
the opportunity to initiate insolvency proceedings 
against debtors in all examined countries. They can 
also express in the ﬁ led proposal their preference as 
to how to settle the insolvency. This clearly conﬁ rms 
their authority on the choice of method of resolving 
the state of insolvency. It is enhanced by the privilege 
of subsequently voting on which settlement method 
will be adopted and, in the context of reorganization, 
by voting on approval of a composition agreement. 
Only registered creditors can vote, and it is therefore 
necessary for each creditor to check the status of 
debtors periodically so as not to miss the deadline 
for registration.
The following table (Tab. II) shows average 
duration, costs and recovery rate of insolvency 
proceedings in countries of Visegrad four according 
to research of Doing business. The results are 
based on cooperation of researchers, insolvency 
administrators, lawyers and insolvency judges in 
certain country. The same model case of bankrupt 
company is discussed in every country.
II: Duration, costs and recovery rate of insolvency proceedings in V4 countries
Country Time (years) Cost (% of estate) Recovery rate (cents on the dollar)
Czech Republic 2.1 17.0 65.6
Hungary 2.0 14.5 40.2
Poland 3.0 15.0 57.0
Slovakia 4.0 18.0 54.4
Source: The World Bank
CONCLUSION
The Visegrad Four countries, i.e. the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Poland are 
connected by their histories, but also by their common endeavours in the economic, political and 
cultural ﬁ elds. A similar historical development among these post-communist countries is reﬂ ected 
in the development of their insolvency laws. At present, the insolvency systems of the V4 countries 
are largely similar. All the monitored countries had to reform their insolvency laws a er 1990, whilst 
in the given countries one can observe certain similar elements, e.g. the supervisory role of the court, 
the function of the insolvency administrator and the evident emphasis on continuity and preservation 
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of economic subjects. Other European states and the USA also apply this principle (Guitérrez, Olmo, 
Afozra, 2012). 
A suitable inspiration for the Czech insolvency system can certainly be found in the Hungary’s 
insolvency system, especially with respect to ﬁ xing the priorities of Hungarian insolvency judicature 
– satisfaction of creditors and reduction of the length of insolvency proceedings. The Insolvency Act 
Act XLIL on Bankruptcy and Liquidation Proceedings was enacted in 1991; the reform thereof, which was 
long-prepared, came into eﬀ ect in 2009. 
As regards practical changes in Czech insolvency law, the position of creditors would be improved by 
the possibility of increasing the deadline for reporting their receivables. 
Although a web application which monitors subjects in insolvency works in practice, and it is likewise 
possible to ﬁ nd all information on subjects in insolvency in the publically accessible Insolvency 
Register, the thirty-day deadline has transpired to be insuﬃ  cient for creditors from the ranks of 
natural persons or smaller companies. The increase thereof or the obligation for a debtor to inform its 
creditors as to its insolvency when bankruptcy is declared would be a solution. This solution would 
probably be diﬃ  cult to enforce in practice. 
On the other hand, it is the creditors’ duty to enforce their outstanding receivables, and therefore 
a variant of punishing creditors who register late with a lower rate of satisfaction for the beneﬁ t of 
timely creditors is an appropriate step. 
Another suitable angle that should certainly be considered is the solution in which all creditors pay 
the costs of insolvency proceedings. In the Czech Republic insolvency petitions are o en rejected 
before even examining whether the company is insolvent, as the ﬁ xed deposit remains unpaid. 
The deposit for costs of the proceedings must be paid by the participant who submits the bankruptcy 
petition. The amount can be up to 50,000 CZK.
In the past few years, legislation has been undergoing dynamic changes in the Czech Republic and in 
the V4 countries. For instance, the Czech Insolvency Act (182/2006 Sb.) has undergone more than 25 
amendments since its enactment. Instead of radical changes in the Insolvency Act, it would be apposite 
to reﬂ ect the most pressing issues from practice (which was, for instance, eﬀ ected by amendment 
No. 294/201, which solved the issue of joint debt-relief of married couples) and especially to allow 
time for the construction of a legal interpretation of individual provisions and judicature. The most 
suitable recommendation is thus to create a stable legislative environment with a certain constancy 
of viewpoints, judicature, practice, and not constant change of conditions and obligations of aﬀ ected 
subjects. The predictability of law is crucial for the functioning of all economic subjects, both those in 
insolvency and those who are prospering. 
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